

30 JAN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

SUBJECT: CIA Relations with DOD in the Covert
Paramilitary Field

I. Problems

A. Conflicting National Directives as to Authority
and Responsibility for Covert Paramilitary
Operations

1. NSC 5412/2, dated 28 December 1955, placed the sole responsibility for covert operations, which term includes covert paramilitary operations, on the Central Intelligence Agency, on the grounds that this would permit correlation of such operations "with espionage and counterespionage operations under the overall control of the Director of Central Intelligence." However, NSAM 57, dated 28 June 1961, states that any "large paramilitary operation" wholly or partly covert which requires large numbers or amounts of militarily trained personnel, equipment, expertise, etc. ... "is properly the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense...". Later NSAM's, [redacted] and subsequent JCS and CINC directives based on such NSAM's, reassert and further specify the DOD's authority and competence in the covert paramilitary field.

2. NSAM 57 further "muddies" the situation by asserting that paramilitary operations "approximate to conventional military operations," and by its attempt to suggest that the "size" of an operation rather than its "covertness" should be the dividing line between DOD and Agency responsibilities in the paramilitary field. Agency experience with paramilitary operations, including resistance, guerrilla warfare, etc. strongly suggests that the differences

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between paramilitary and conventional military operations are more significant than the similarities. As to the criteria of "size", believe that insofar as it is relevant at all, it is more useful as a dividing line between covert and overt rather than as a dividing line between Agency and DOD covert responsibilities. Since NSAM 57 was written in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, its intimation that an operation of such scope, purpose and time scale could have been covertly conducted by DOD is dangerously misleading. The fact probably is that DOD should have been responsible for this operation in its later stages, not because it was a large-scale covert operation but because as a large-scale operation it was inevitably overt.

B. Inadequacy of Present Coordination Procedures for Overt and Covert Paramilitary Operations by Special Groups 5412 or CI.

1. Although NSAM 57 directed that any proposed paramilitary operation in the concept stage be presented to the Special Group 5412, DOD has not so far complied.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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C. Funding Problems

1. Issues have arisen between DOD and CIA concerning the responsibility for and manner of providing [REDACTED] for paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia.

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III. Recommended Solutions

A. Secure the withdrawal or rewrite of those recent National level and JCS directives which contravene the Agency's primary responsibility for covert operations as established in NSC 5412/2.


B. Insure that DOD presents its overt paramilitary operations in the "concept" stage to Special Group (5412) for approval and in order to preclude conflict or duplication with covert paramilitary programs.

C. CIA to invite formal, early, and continuing liaison and/or participation by designated DOD representatives in the planning, support, training, and execution of its covert paramilitary operations, both in Washington and in the field, provided such DOD personnel are under full operational and security control of the Agency. It is DDP's present intention to use the SOD War Room, just now being completed, for such joint Washington level

briefing, consultation, and planning with representatives
of ISA, JCS, and General Lansdale's office.



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